I foresaw such a length of time between the date of that and
receipt of the answer, as would give it the air of a prescription after
the death of the patient. I hope the whole affair is settled, and that
you are established in good titles to all the lands. Still, however,
being on the subject, I cannot help adding a word, in answer to the
objection which you say is raised on the words 'the estate,' instead of
'my estate.' It has long been confessed in the courts, that the
first decision, that a devise of lands to a person without words
of inheritance, should carry an estate for life only, was an absurd
decision, founded on feudal principles, after feudal ideas had long been
lost by the unlettered writers of their own wills: and it has often been
said, that were the matter to begin again, it should be decided that
such a devise should carry a fee simple, as every body is sensible
testators intend, by these expressions. The courts, therefore,
circumscribe the authority of this chain of decisions, all hanging on
the first link, as much as possible; and they avail themselves of every
possible circumstance which may render any new case unlike the old one,
and authorize them to conform their judgments to common sense, and the
will of the testator. Hence they decide, that in a devise of 'my estate
at M.' to such a one, without words of inheritance, the word estate is
descriptive of the duration of the interest bequeathed, as well as its
locality. From the same desire of getting back into the paths of common
sense, they would not suffer the particle 'the' instead of 'my', to make
a difference. 'My estate at M.' means not only my lands at M., but my
fee simple in them. 'The estate at M.' means not only 'the lands the
testator holds at M., but the fee simple he has in them.' Another
objection will be made, perhaps, viz. that the testator devises in
the same clause his estate called Marrow-bone, his tract called
Horse-pasture, and his tract called Poison-field; that it is probable he
intended to give the same interest in all; and as it is confessed that
the word tract conveys but an estate for life, we must conclude that the
word estate was meant to convey the same. I should reverse the argument,
and say, as it confessed the word estate, conveys an estate in fee
simple, we must conclude the word tract was meant to convey the same;
that this conclusion coincides with the wishes of the courts, as
bringing them back to what is right an