the brigs
captured at Arica, as were also the Spanish colonels, Sierra and Suares,
who had been taken prisoners, but whom I liberated on their _parole_,
not to serve again until regularly exchanged.

It has been said that, before sailing to Arica, I had procured from
General San Martin discretionary powers to do as I pleased with the
troops placed at my disposal. My object was believed to be to create a
diversion in favour of the general, but this was the least part of my
intention; for, as the army had remained inactive from its first landing
in Peru--with the exception of the detachment under Colonel
Arenales,--no diversion would have been of much use. I wrote to the
Government at Santiago for 1,000 men, or, if these could not be sent,
for 500, and also for 1,000 stand of arms, of which there was abundance
in the arsenal to equip recruits, who would have been forthcoming; and
with these we could, with the greatest ease, have secured the whole of
the southern provinces of Peru, the people being warmly disposed in our
favour. I therefore told the Government that with such a force, we could
hold the whole of Lower Peru, and gain eventual possession of Upper
Peru. My request was refused, on the false ground that the Government
had no means to equip such an expedition, and thus the good will
manifested by the natives was thrown away.

In spite of this neglect, I determined to persevere, relying upon
sacrifices made by the Peruvians themselves in our favour. General
Ramirez was actively engaged in drawing men from distant garrisons to
act against our small force, which was suffering severely from ague.
Nevertheless, every effort was made again to advance into the
interior--a number of recruits from the adjacent provinces having been
enrolled--and everything promised a general revolt in favour of
independence, when the Governor of Arequipa communicated to us
intelligence that an armistice had been agreed upon for twenty days,
between General San Martin and the Viceroy Lacerna. This happening just
at the moment when hostilities could have been carried on with the
greatest effect, and we were preparing to attack Arequipa itself--was
annoying in the extreme; the more so, as the application had come from
the Viceroy, who, being the first to receive intelligence of our
success, had, no doubt, deceived General San Martin into the
arrangement, in order to check our operations in the South.

This armistice was ratified on the 23