those that we receive immediately from Sense. But be our
pleasures excited how they will; or whatsoever they consist in, Those
that Men receive from the Gratification of antecedent desire, are the
pleasures that they have the strongest relish of. _A Good_ not
desir'd, making (comparatively) but a small Impression upon us.

Now the Gratification of their desires is not always in Men's Power,
but oftentimes it is so. It is then often in their choice to procure
to themselves pleasure, or not. Whence it is reasonable for them to
inquire, since happiness consists in pleasure; and the Gratification
of their Desires, and Appetites, always gives them pleasure; whether,
or no, to Gratifie _These_ should not therefore always be that which
should determine their actions in pursuance of this their chief End?

That happiness consisting in pleasure, we are so much the happier as
we enjoy more pleasure, must unquestionably, be found true; but that
the Gratification of Men's Desires and Appetites cannot therefore be
that which should always, as they are rational Agents, determine, or
regulate their actions in pursuit of happiness, is no less evident; in
that we perceive our selves, and the Things to which we have relation,
to be so fram'd, and constituted, in respect one of another, that the
Gratification of our present Desires and Appetites, does sometimes for
a short, or small pleasure, procure to us a greater, and more durable
Pain: and that on the contrary, the denial, or restraint of our
present Desires, and Appetites, does sometimes for a short, or small
Pain, procure to us a greater, or more durable Pleasure. Since then
that we should act contrary to our own end therein, and prefer less
pleasure to greater, it is apparent that the Gratification of our
present Appetites cannot be that which always, as we are rational
Agents, proposing to our selves happiness for our chief end, should
determine, or regulate our voluntary actions; present Appetite telling
us only what will give us present pleasure; not what will, in the
whole, procure to us the most pleasure. What else then appears to be
the Rule, or Measure of Men's actions acting purely with respect to
the pursuit of happiness as their chief End, but the determinations of
that Faculty in them which, in reference to the different properties
and relations discernable in Things, can alone be the Judge what will,
in the whole, procure to them the most pleasure? And thus the very
des