r
twenty of his own men rallied by Lieutenant Walker, who fell in that
encounter. Osman Khan, too, a chief whose men were amongst the foremost,
voluntarily halted them and drew them off, "which may be reckoned,
indeed, (says Lieutenant Eyre,) the chief reason why _all_ of our people
who on that day went forth to battle were not destroyed." The gun and
the second limber which had arrived from the cantonments, in attempting
to gallop down hill, was overturned and lost. "Our loss was
tremendous--the greater part of the wounded, including Colonel Oliver,
having been left in the field, where they were miserably cut to
pieces."[23]
[23] In Mr Eyre's observations on this disastrous affair, he
enumerates six errors, which he says must present themselves to
the most unpractised military eye. "The first, and perhaps the
most fatal mistake of all, was the taking only one gun;" but he
admits that there was only one gun ready, and that, if the
Brigadier had waited for the second, he must have postponed the
enterprise for a day. This would probably have been the more
prudent course.
The second error was, that advantage was not taken of the panic
in the village, to storm it at once in the dark; but it appears
from his own account, that there were not more than forty men
remaining in the village when it was attacked, after daylight,
and that the chief cause of the failure of that attack, was
Major Swayne's having missed the gate, a misfortune which was,
certainly, at least as likely to have occurred in the dark.
The third was, that the sappers were not employed to raise a
breastwork for the protection of the troops. This objection
appears to be well founded.
The fourth was, that the infantry were formed into squares, to
resist the distant fire of infantry, on ground over which no
cavalry could have charged with effect. It appears to be so
utterly unintelligible that any officer should have been guilty
of so manifest an absurdity, that the circumstances seem to
require further elucidation; but that the formation was
unfortunate, is sufficiently obvious.
Fifthly, that the position chosen for the cavalry was
erroneous; and sixthly, that the retreat was too long deferred.
Both these objections appear to be just.
Thus terminated in disaster the military struggle at Cabul, and then
commenc
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