work of the
military leader which was so congenial to his aptitudes, and more of
that of the administrator, to him naturally distasteful.
Nevertheless, as the complete fulfilment of his orders necessitated the
reduction of a fortified seaport, he found in this undertaking the
opportunity for showing a degree of resolution and presence of mind
which was certainly not exceeded--perhaps not even equaled--in his
previous career. At Mobile it was the tactician, the man of instant
perception and ready action, rather than he of clear insight and careful
planning, that is most conspicuous. On the same occasion, with actual
disaster incurred and imminent confusion threatening his fleet, combined
with a resistance sturdier than any he had yet encountered, the
admiral's firmness and tenacity rose equal to the highest demand ever
made upon them. In the lofty courage and stern determination which
plucked victory out of the very jaws of defeat, the battle of Mobile
Bay was to the career of Farragut what the battle of Copenhagen was to
that of Nelson. Perhaps we may even say, borrowing the words of an
eloquent French writer upon the latter event, the battle of Mobile will
always be in the eyes of seamen Farragut's surest claim to glory.[W]
[Footnote W: "The campaign of the Baltic will always be in the eyes of
seamen Nelson's fairest claim to glory. He alone was capable of
displaying such boldness and such perseverance; he alone could face the
immense difficulties of that enterprise and triumph over them."--Jurien
de la Graviere, _Guerres Maritimes_.]
Up to the time of Farragut's departure for the North, in August, 1863,
the blockade of the Gulf sea-coast within the limits of his command,
though technically effective, had for the most part only been enforced
by the usual method of cruising or anchoring off the entrances of the
ports. Such a watch, however, is a very imperfect substitute for the
iron yoke that is imposed by holding all the principal harbors, the
gateways for communication with the outer world. This was clearly enough
realized; and the purpose of Farragut, as of his Government, had been so
to occupy the ports within his district. At one time, in December, 1862,
he was able to say exultingly that he did so hold the whole coast,
except Mobile; but the disasters at Galveston and Sabine Pass quickly
intervened, and those ports remained thenceforth in the hands of the
enemy. On the Texas coast, however, blockade-running
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