oge falls into three periods. A period of great vigour and almost
despotic power dates from the foundation of the Dukedom, in the year
697, down to the reign of Pietro Ziani in 1172. During this first
period, the Ducal authority showed a tendency to become concentrated,
and almost hereditary in the hands of one or two powerful families. For
example, we have seen Doges of the Partecipazio house, five Doges of the
Candiani, and three of the Orseoli. But the rivalry and balanced power
of these great families eventually exhausted one another, and preserved
the Dukedom of Venice from ever becoming a kingdom. A second period
extends from the year 1172 down to 1457, and is marked by the emergence
of the great commercial houses, and the development of the oligarchy
upon the basis of a Great Council. The aristocracy during this period
were engaged in excluding the people from any share in the government,
and in curbing and finally crushing the authority of the Doge. The steps
in this process are indicated by the closing of the Great Council, the
revolution of Tiepolo, the trials of Marino Faliero, Lorenzo Celsi, and
the Foscari. The third period covers what remains of the Republic, from
1457 down to 1797. During this period the Doge was little other than the
figurehead of the Republic; the point of least weight and greatest
splendour; the brilliant apex to the pyramid of the Venetian
constitution.

So far, then, we have examined the four tiers in the original structure
of the constitution, the Doge, the College, the Senate, and the Great
Council; and we have seen that, broadly speaking these were,
respectively, ornamental, initiative and executive, legislative, and
elective. But this pyramid of the constitution was not perfectly
symmetrical; its edges were broken. This interruption of outline was
caused by the Council of Ten. The exact position in the Venetian
constitution occupied by this famous Council, and its relations to the
other members of the government, have proved a constant source of
difficulty and error to students of Venetian history. Leaving aside the
obscure problem of the origin of the Ten, it is still possible for us to
indicate the constitutional necessity which called that Council into
existence. As we have pointed out, the College could not act on its own
responsibility without the Senate; the Senate could not initiate without
the College, for the preparation of all affairs passed through the hands
of the Col