alone. The judgment on the relation, of
means to ends certainly belongs to reason. But "good" or "evil" always
implies only a reference to the "will," as resolved by the law of
reason, to make something its object.
Thus good and evil properly relate to actions, not to personal
sensations. So, if anything is to be reckoned simply good or evil, it
can only be so estimated by the way of acting. Hence, only the maxim of
the will, and consequently the person himself, can be called good or
evil, not the thing itself.
The Stoic was right, even though he might be laughed at, who during
violent attacks of gout exclaimed, "Pain, I will never admit that thou
art an evil!" What he felt was indeed what we call a bad thing; but he
had no reason to admit that any evil attached thereby to himself, for
the pain did not in the least detract from his personal worth, but only
from that of his condition. If a single lie had been on his conscience
it would have humiliated his soul; but pain seemed only to elevate it,
when he was not conscious of having deserved it as a punishment for any
unjust deed.
The rule of judgment subject to the laws of pure practical reason is
this: Ask yourself whether if the action you propose were to happen by a
natural system of law, of which you were yourself a part, you could
regard it as possible by your own will? In fact, everyone does decide by
this rule whether actions are morally good or evil.
_II.--Dialectic of Practical Reason_
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
Pure practical reason postulates the immortality of the soul, for reason
in the pure and practical sense aims at the perfect good (_summum
bonum_), and this perfect good is only possible on the supposition of
the soul's immortality. It is the moral law which determines the will,
and, in this will, the perfect harmony of the mind with the moral law,
is the supreme condition of the _summum bonum_. The principle of the
moral destination of our nature--that only by endless progress can we
come into full harmony with the moral law--is of the greatest use, not
only for fortifying the speculative reason, but also with respect to
religion. In default of this, either the moral law is degraded from its
holiness, being represented as indulging our convenience, or else men
strain after an unattainable aim, hoping to gain absolute holiness of
will, thus losing themselves in fanatical theosophic dreams utterly
contradicting self-knowledge.
For a
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