ule. The unfitness would be increased by the short
period during which they held office. There would be no traditions
of government among them, as in a Greek or Italian oligarchy, and no
individual would be responsible for any of their acts. Everything seems
to have been sacrificed to a false notion of equality, according to
which all have a turn of ruling and being ruled. In the constitution
of the Magnesian state Plato has not emancipated himself from the
limitations of ancient politics. His government may be described as
a democracy of magistrates elected by the people. He never troubles
himself about the political consistency of his scheme. He does indeed
say that the greater part of the good of this world arises, not from
equality, but from proportion, which he calls the judgment of Zeus
(compare Aristotle's Distributive Justice), but he hardly makes any
attempt to carry out the principle in practice. There is no attempt
to proportion representation to merit; nor is there any body in his
commonwealth which represents the life either of a class or of the whole
state. The manner of appointing magistrates is taken chiefly from the
old democratic constitution of Athens, of which it retains some of the
worst features, such as the use of the lot, while by doing away with
the political character of the popular assembly the mainspring of the
machine is taken out. The guardians of the law, thirty-seven in number,
of whom the ten eldest reappear as a part of the Nocturnal Council at
the end of the twelfth book, are to be elected by the whole military
class, but they are to hold office for twenty years, and would therefore
have an oligarchical rather than a democratic character. Nothing is said
of the manner in which the functions of the Nocturnal Council are to
be harmonized with those of the guardians of the law, or as to how the
ordinary council is related to it.

Similar principles are applied to inferior offices. To some the
appointment is made by vote, to others by lot. In the elections to the
priesthood, Plato endeavours to mix or balance in a friendly manner
'demus and not demus.' The commonwealth of the Laws, like the Republic,
cannot dispense with a spiritual head, which is the same in both--the
oracle of Delphi. From this the laws about all divine things are to be
derived. The final selection of the Interpreters, the choice of an heir
for a vacant lot, the punishment for removing a deposit, are also to be
determine