n old grudge against Ali, succeeded in making their
escape to Irak, where at Basra they raised the standard of rebellion.
Ali in point of fact had no real right to the succession, and moreover
was apparently actuated not by piety but by ambition and the desire of
power, so that men of penetration, even although they condemned Othman's
method of government, yet refused to recognize his successor. The new
caliph, however, found means of disposing of their opposition, and at
the battle of the Camel, fought at Basra in November 656, Talha and
Zobair were slain, and Ayesha was taken prisoner.

But even so Ali had not secured peace. With the murder of Othman the
dynastic principle gained the twofold advantage of a legitimate
cry--that of vengeance for the blood of the grey-haired caliph and a
distinguished champion, the governor Moawiya, whose position in Syria
was impregnable. The kernel of his subjects consisted of genuine Arabs,
not only recent immigrants along with Islam, but also old settlers who,
through contact with the Roman empire and the Christian church, had
become to some extent civilized. Through the Ghassanids these latter had
become habituated to monarchical government and loyal obedience, and for
a long time much better order had prevailed amongst them than elsewhere
in Arabia. Syria was the proper soil for the rise of an Arabian kingdom,
and Moawiya was just the man to make use of the situation. He exhibited
Othman's blood-stained garment in the mosque at Damascus, and incited
his Syrians to vengeance.

Ali's position in Kufa was much less advantageous. The population of
Irak was already mixed up with Persian elements; it fluctuated greatly,
and was largely composed of fresh immigrants. Islam had its headquarters
here; Kufa and Basra were the home of the pious and of the adventurer,
the centres of religious and political movement. This movement it was
that had raised Ali to the Caliphate, but yet it did not really take any
personal interest in him. Religion proved for him a less trustworthy and
more dangerous support than did the conservative and secular feeling of
Syria for the Omayyads. Moawiya could either act or refrain from acting
as he chose, secure in either case of the obedience of his subjects.
Ali, on the other hand, was unable to convert enthusiasm for the
principle inscribed on his banner into enthusiasm for his person. It was
necessary that he should accommodate himself to the wishes of his
supp