tematic
cruelties of Germany, inflicted by order on the helpless populations of
Serbia and Belgium and northern France, are not matter of controversy;
they have been proved by many extant military documents and by the
testimony of many living witnesses. They were designed to reduce whole
peoples to a state of impotent terror, beneath the level of humanity.
The apology made for them, that by shortening resistance to the
inevitable they were in effect merciful, is a blasphemous apology, which
puts Germany in the place of the Almighty. The effect anticipated did
not follow. The system of terrorism hardened and prolonged resistance;
it launched against Germany the chivalry of the world; it created for
use against Germany the chivalry of the air; and it left Germany
unhonoured in her ultimate downfall.

The German plan of campaign, it was rightly believed, was a swift
invasion and disablement of France, to be followed by more prolonged
operations against Russia. By this plan the German army was to reach
Paris on the fortieth day after mobilization. There was no promise that
Great Britain would help France, but the attitude of Germany had long
been so threatening that the General Staffs of the two countries had
taken counsel with each other concerning the best manner of employing
the British forces in the event of common resistance to German
aggression. It had been provisionally agreed that the British army
should be concentrated on the left flank of the French army, in the area
between Avesnes and Le Cateau, but this agreement was based on the
assumption that the two armies would be mobilized simultaneously. When
the principal British Ministers and the leading members of the naval and
military staffs assembled at Downing street on the 5th and 6th of
August, we were already behindhand, and the whole question of the
employment and disposition of the expeditionary force had to be
reopened. It was expected by some soldiers and some civilians that the
little British army would be landed at a point on the coast of France or
Belgium whence it could strike at the flank of the German invaders. The
strategic advantages of that idea had to yield to the enormous
importance of giving moral and material support to our Allies by
fighting at their side; moreover, there could be no assurance that the
coast of Belgium would not fall into the hands of the Germans at a very
early stage in the campaign. Accordingly, it was agreed to ship our arm