y revetted with
timberings and stout wicker-work. At intervals it is strengthened with
small forts or sentry-boxes of concrete, built into the parapet. Great
and deep dug-outs lie below it, and though many of these have now been
destroyed, the shafts of most of them can still be seen. At the mouths
of some of these shafts one may still see giant-legged periscopes by
which men sheltered in the dug-out shafts could watch for the coming
of an attack. When the attack began and the barrage lifted, these
watchers called up the bombers and machine-gunners from their
underground barracks, and had them in action within a few seconds.

Though the wire was formidable and the trench immense, the real
defences of the position were artillery and machine-guns. The
machine-guns were the chief danger. One machine-gun with ample
ammunition has concentrated in itself the defensive power of a
battalion. The enemy had not less than a dozen machine-guns in and in
front of the Kern Redoubt. Some of these were cunningly hidden in
pits, tunnels and shelters in (or even outside) the obstacle of the
wire at the salient, so that they could enfilade the No Man's Land, or
shoot an attacking party in the back after it had passed. The sites of
these machine-gun nests were well hidden from all observation, and
were frequently changed. Besides the machine-guns outside and in the
front line, there were others, mounted in the trees and in the higher
ground above the front line, in such position that they, too, could
play upon the No Man's Land and the English front line. The artillery
concentrated behind Gommecourt was of all calibres. It was a greater
concentration than the enemy could then usually afford to defend any
one sector, but the number of guns in it is not known. On July 1 it
developed a more intense artillery fire upon Hebuterne, and the
English line outside it, than upon any part of the English attack
throughout the battlefield.

In the attack of July 1, Gommecourt was assaulted simultaneously from
the north (from the direction of Fonquevillers) and from the south
(from the direction of Hebuterne). Mr. Liveing took part in the
southern assault, and must have "gone in" near the Hebuterne-Bucquoy
Road. The tactical intention of these simultaneous attacks from north
and south was to "pinch off" and secure the salient. The attack to the
north, though gallantly pushed, was unsuccessful. The attack to the
south got across the first-line trench an