my fifth proposition), viz, the giving of
occasion to the weak to condemn our lawful deeds, and the animating of
them to follow our example against their own consciences--both ways we may
make them to sin. The Apostle, 1 Cor. x. 29, where he is speaking of a
certain kind of idolothites which are in themselves lawful, and only evil
in the case of scandal, showeth, that if the weak, in a private banquet,
see the strong eating such meats as have been offered to idols,
notwithstanding of warning given, then is the weak one scandalised,
because, would the Apostle say, _Vel ipse etiam edet tuo exemplo,
vacillante conseientia, vel tacite factum tuum damnabit._(400) Behold what
scandal may arise even out of things which are in themselves lawful, which
also ariseth out of the ceremonies (let them be as lawful as can be). 1.
We art provoked to disallow of lawful things, and to condemn the doers as
superstitious and popishly affected. 2. We are animated by the example of
Formalists to practise conformity, which in our consciences we condemn,
and by consequence do sin, because he that doubteth is damned, and
whatsoever is not of faith is sin.

_Sect._ 10. Let us see next how the Bishop of Edinburgh can help the
cause. He will have us not to respect scandal, because it is removed by
the law. "For (saith he(401)) by obedience to a lawful ordinance, no man
gives scandal, and if any take offence, both the cause and occasion
thereof is the perverseness only of the person offended." Tertullian saith
well, _Res bona neminem offendit nisi malam mentem_.

_Ans._ 1. I show in my ninth proposition, that the ordinance of superiors
cannot make that to be no scandal which otherwise should be scandal. If
this be not taken well from us, let one of our opposites speak for us, who
acknowledgeth that human power cannot make us do that which we cannot do
without giving of scandal, and that, in this case, the pretext of
obedience to superiors shall not excuse us at the hands of the Supreme
Judge.

2. I would learn of him what makes a lawful ordinance about matters of
fact or things to be done? Not the will of superiors, else there shall be
no unlawful ordinances (for every ordinance hath the will of the
ordainer), not the lawfulness of the thing in itself which is ordained
neither, for then every ordinance which prescribeth a thing lawful in
itself, were it never so inexpedient in respect of supervenient
circumstances, should be lawful. To a lawful