ends that "a full
and just conception of the individual abolishes the supposed opposition
between the Man and the State."[50] Long ago Hegel exclaimed: "Our life
is hid with our fellows in the common life of our people," and his true
and fruitful conception forms the basis of the political philosophy of
T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Bernard Bosanquet. It is, also, the
foundation of all that is good and enduring in present-day Socialism.
The individual apart from society is a mere abstraction, like the
"economic man" of the old economists.

What, then, are these so-called "personal liberties" which the
individual is supposed to possess in virtue of his humanity and
independently of any authority external to himself? If it is said that
they are freedom of thought, freedom of emotion, and freedom of will,
the criticism is that these are not "liberties" at all, but merely
movements of the mind which no power whatsoever external to the
individual can possibly control, and with which no political authority
in the country would ever dream of attempting to interfere. If, however,
it is said that they include further such things as freedom of speech,
freedom of writing, freedom of public meeting, freedom to act generally
as conscience dictates, the criticism is that such liberties as these
are not "personal" merely, or even primarily: they are liberties that
profoundly affect the community. Regarded from the communal point of
view, in fact, they are not "personal liberties" at all, if by that term
is meant individual rights. They are rights derived from the community;
they are concessions to be granted or withheld according to the
requirements of public policy; they are matters of regulation by the
common will. Society does not, and cannot, recognize the existence,
independent of its own consent, of any such so-called "personal
liberties." It does not, and cannot, admit the possession by individuals
of any rights, inherent and indefeasible, to do as they like in matters
that concern the interests of the community generally. Still less can
the State be expected to protect individuals in the exercise of
activities which it regards as detrimental, or in the neglect of duties
which it regards as essential, to the general well-being. It cannot
restrain anyone's conscience; but it must control everyone's conduct.
All this, of course, is the commonplace of political theory, and it is
curious that at this late day one should have to r