earliest opportunity. The German nation, in
fact, is suffering from some form of arrested development, and arrested
development, as the criminologists tell us, is almost invariably
accompanied by morbid psychology. That Germany at the present moment, and
for some time past, has been the victim of a morbid state of mind, few
impartial observers will deny. It has, however, not been so generally
recognised that this disease--for it is nothing less--is due not to any
national depravity but to constitutional and structural defects, which are
themselves the result of an unfortunate series of historical accidents. Let
us look a little closer into this matter, considering the three defects in
German nationalism one by one, and using the story of Italy as an aid to
our investigation.

[Footnote 1: There are also Germans living in Switzerland, the Baltic
Provinces of Russia, and the United States of America; but these may be
regarded as lost to the German nation as the French Canadians are lost to
France.]

First, then, why was it that, while the unification of Italy led to the
inclusion of the whole Italian nationality within the State frontiers, with
the trifling exceptions above referred to, the unification of Germany was
only brought about, or even made possible, by the _exclusion_ of a large
section of the nationality? Germany, like Italy, was hampered by traditions
inherited from the mediaeval Roman Empire, represented by an ancient
capital which stood in the path of unity. Why was it that, while Italy
could not and would not do without Rome, Germany was compelled to surrender
Vienna and to exclude Austria? The answer is: because the unification of
Germany was only possible through the instrumentality of Prussia, which
would not brook the rivalry of Austria, and therefore the latter had to go.
The problem of the making of Germany as it presented itself to the mind
of Bismarck was first of all a problem as to which should be _supreme_ in
Germany, Prussia or Austria; in other words Bismarck cared more for the
aggrandisement of Prussia than for the unity of Germany.[1] To the mind
of Cavour the problem of the unification of Italy presented itself in
a totally different light. For him there was no question of the
aggrandisement of Piedmont, though he no doubt felt pride in the thought
that the House of Savoy was to possess the throne of Italy. Austria was
expelled from Italy in 1860, not that Piedmont might take her place as