ws of order, and in this case unlimited
power is requisite." On the approach of the Revolution the same doctrine
reappears, except in the substitution of one term for another term.
In the place of the sovereignty of the king the "Contrat social"
substitutes the sovereignty of the people. The latter, however, is much
more absolute than the former, and, in the democratic convent which
Rousseau constructs, on Spartan and Roman model, the individual is
nothing and the State everything.

In effect, "the clauses of the social contract reduce themselves to one,
namely, the total transfer of each associate with all his rights to the
community."[3420] Every one surrenders himself entirely, "just as he
stands, he and all his forces, of which his property forms a portion."
There is no exception nor reservation; whatever he may have been
previously and whatever may have belonged to him is no longer his own.
Henceforth whatever he becomes or whatever he may possess devolves
on him only through the delegation of the social body, the universal
proprietor and absolute master. All rights must be vested in the State
and none in the individual; otherwise there would be litigation between
them, and, "as there is no common superior to decide between them"
their litigation would never end. One the contrary, through the complete
donation which each one makes of himself, "the unity is as perfect as
possible;" having renounced himself "he has no further claim to make."

This being admitted let us trace the consequences.--

In the first place, I enjoy my property only through tolerance and at
second-hand; for, according to the social contract, I have surrendered
it;[3421] "it now forms a portion of the national estate;" If I retain
the use of its for the time being it is through a concession of the
State which makes me a "depositary" of it. And this favor must not
be considered as restitution. "Far from accepting the property
of individuals society despoils them of it, simply converting
the usurpation into a veritable right, the enjoyment of it into
proprietorship." Previous to the social contract I was possessor not
by right but in fact and even unjustly if I had large possessions;
for, "every man has naturally a right to whatever he needs," and I have
robbed other men of all that I possessed beyond my subsistence.
Hence, so far from the State being under obligation to me, I am under
obligation to it, the property which it returns to me not b