may be ordered by the court. The amount of the
debt is immaterial: a small sum will suffice, provided its non-payment is
proof of insolvency. Bankruptcy can only be declared where there is
insolvency. The judgment adjudicating a debtor bankrupt deprives the
bankrupt of the right to administer his affairs, and nominates a trustee to
realize the property under the superintendence of a judge and a commission
of creditors. All the property of the bankrupt, movable and immovable, is
sold by auction and distributed in dividends. This is one way of closing
the bankruptcy, but it may also be closed by an arrangement. No minimum
percentage is required for such arrangement, but it must have the assent of
creditors representing three-fourths of the bankrupt's indebtedness.
Composition before bankruptcy is not recognized by Italian law. Bankrupts
are liable to criminal proceedings involving punishments more or less heavy
for offences against the law, _e.g._ for not keeping books in the way
prescribed by law.

_United States._--After much fragmentary legislation the bankruptcy system
of the United States is now embodied in the National Bankruptcy Act of
1898, as amended by the act of 1903. The acts of bankruptcy under the act
may be summarized as follows: where a debtor (1) removes any of his
property to hinder or delay his creditors; (2) being insolvent, transfers
property with intent to prefer a creditor; (3) suffers any creditor to
obtain a preference; (4) makes a general assignment for the benefit of his
creditors; (5) "admits in writing his inability to pay his debts and his
willingness to be adjudicated a bankrupt on that ground." These acts of
bankruptcy do not include, it will be observed, non-payment by a debtor of
his debts. A debtor can therefore only be adjudicated a bankrupt on the
ground of indebtedness with his own consent in writing. Presumably the
legislature thought that the desire to obtain the protection and privilege
of bankruptcy would be a sufficient inducement to confess insolvency, where
such insolvency, in fact, exists.

To constitute a fraudulent preference it is not necessary, as it is under
English law, that the payment should be made "with a view to prefer" the
favoured creditor. It is enough that the creditor is preferred. This avoids
the nice questions of legal casuistry which have embarrassed the English
courts, and it is the more rational rule, for creditors are not concerned
with a debtor's intenti