ugh in
themselves, of some old institution, and are preserved because, though
they look strange, they are found to work well. Thus the King of England
was at one time the actual sovereign of the State, or at any rate the
most important member of the sovereign power, and the Ministers were in
reality, what they are still in name, the King's servants. The powers of
the Crown have been greatly diminished, and have been transferred in
effect to the Houses of Parliament, or rather to the House of Commons,
and the Ministers taken from the Houses are in fact, though not in name,
servants of Parliament. This arrangement leaves an undefined and
undefinable amount of authority to the Crown. It is not an arrangement
which any man would have planned beforehand; but it is kept up, not
because it is an anomaly, but because it has, as a matter of
experience, turned out convenient. What even plausible argument can
thence be drawn to show that a new constitutional arrangement, on the
face of it awkward and inconvenient, will for some unknown reason turn
out workable and beneficial? He who reasons thus, if reasoning it can be
called, might as well argue that because an old shoe which has gradually
been worn to the form of the foot is comfortable, therefore a shoemaker
need not care to make a new shoe fit.

These two general replies to strictures on the new constitution are in
themselves of no worth whatever. They deserve examination for two
reasons only. They are, in various shapes, put forward by politicians of
eminence, they exhibit further in a clear form a defect which mars a
good deal of Gladstonian reasoning. Ministerialists seem to think that
arguments good for the purpose of conservatism are available for the
purpose of innovation. This is an error. A conservative reasoner may
urge the uncertainty of all prevision, or the fact that the actual
constitution, though theoretically absurd or imperfect, works well, as
reasons of some weight, though not of overwhelming weight, for leaving
things as they are, but it must puzzle any sensible man to see how
either the uncertainty of prevision or the fair working of existing
institutions can be twisted into reasons for taking a political leap in
the dark.

Let us dismiss then objections which as they are fatal to all criticism
are in reality ineffective against any criticism of our new
constitution. When this is done it will be found that the Gladstonian
pleas in favour of Home Rule, for