were forfeited all
the rights appendant to those lands; by the same power that grants the
lands, the rights also are granted. The right, lost to the patron, falls
not to the people, but is either retained by the crown, or, what to the
people is the same thing, is by the crown given away. Let it change
hands ever so often, it is possessed by him that receives it, with the
same right as it was conveyed. It may, indeed, like all our possessions,
be forcibly seized or fraudulently obtained. But no injury is still done
to the people; for what they never had, they have never lost. Caius may
usurp the right of Titius, but neither Caius nor Titius injure the
people; and no man's conscience, however tender or however active, can
prompt him to restore what may be proved to have been never taken away.
Supposing, what I think cannot be proved, that a popular election of
ministers were to be desired, our desires are not the measure of equity.
It were to be desired, that power should be only in the hands of the
merciful, and riches in the possession of the generous; but the law must
leave both riches and power where it finds them; and must often leave
riches with the covetous, and power with the cruel. Convenience may be a
rule in little things, where no other rule has been established. But, as
the great end of government is to give every man his own, no
inconvenience is greater than that of making right uncertain. Nor is any
man more an enemy to publick peace, than he who fills weak heads with
imaginary claims, and breaks the series of civil subordination, by
inciting the lower classes of mankind to encroach upon the higher.

Having thus shown that the right of patronage, being originally
purchased, may be legally transferred, and that it is now in the hands
of lawful possessours, at least as certainly as any other right, we have
left the advocates of the people no other plea than that of convenience.
Let us, therefore, now consider what the people would really gain by a
general abolition of the right of patronage. What is most to be desired
by such a change is, that the country should be supplied with better
ministers. But why should we suppose that the parish will make a wiser
choice than the patron? If we suppose mankind actuated by interest, the
patron is more likely to choose with caution, because he will suffer
more by choosing wrong. By the deficiencies of his minister, or by his
vices, he is equally offended with the rest of