of injustice and the
encroachments of arbitrary power. But the framers of the Constitution
were also undoubtedly aware that this formidable instrument had been and
might be abused, and that from its very nature an impeachment for high
crimes and misdemeanors, whatever might be its result, would in most
cases be accompanied by so much of dishonor and reproach, solicitude and
suffering, as to make the power of preferring it one of the highest
solemnity and importance. It was due to both these considerations that
the impeaching power should be lodged in the hands of those who from
the mode of their election and the tenure of their offices would most
accurately express the popular will and at the same time be most
directly and speedily amenable to the people. The theory of these wise
and benignant intentions is in the present case effectually defeated by
the proceedings of the Senate. The members of that body represent not
the people, but the States; and though they are undoubtedly responsible
to the States, yet from their extended term of service the effect of
that responsibility during the whole period of that term must very much
depend upon their own impressions of its obligatory force. When a body
thus constituted expresses beforehand its opinion in a particular case,
and thus indirectly invites a prosecution, it not only assumes a power
intended for wise reasons to be confined to others, but it shields the
latter from that exclusive and personal responsibility under which it
was intended to be exercised, and reverses the whole scheme of this
part of the Constitution.

Such would be some of the objections to this procedure, even if it were
admitted that there is just ground for imputing to the President the
offenses charged in the resolution. But if, on the other hand, the House
of Representatives shall be of opinion that there is no reason for
charging them upon him, and shall therefore deem it improper to prefer
an impeachment, then will the violation of privilege as it respects that
House, of justice as it regards the President, and of the Constitution
as it relates to both be only the more conspicuous and impressive.

The constitutional mode of procedure on an impeachment has not only been
wholly disregarded, but some of the first principles of natural right
and enlightened jurisprudence have been violated in the very form of the
resolution. It carefully abstains from averring in _which_ of "the late
proceedings i