h. Thus the rear-guard, which, according to these writers;
left-on the 29th, did not remain, even according to their own hypothesis,
three days after the army to see the sick die. In reality it left on the
29th of May, the day after we did: Here are the very words of the
Major-General (Berthier) in his official account, written under the eye
and under the dictation of the Commander-in-Chief:--

The army arrived at Jaffa, 5th Prairial (24th May), and remained
there the 6th, 7th, and 8th (25th-27th May). This time was employed
in punishing the village, which had behaved badly. The
fortifications of Jaffa were blown up. All the iron guns of the
place were thrown into the sea. The wounded were removed by sea and
by land. There were only a few ships, and to give time to complete
the evacuation by land, the departure of the army had to be deferred
until the 9th (28th May). Klebers division formed the rear-guard,
and only left Jaffa, on the 10th (29th May).

The official report of what passed at Jaffa was drawn up by Berthier,
under the eye of Bonaparte. It has been published; but it may be
remarked that not a word about the infected, not a word of the visit to
the hospital, or the touching of the plague-patients with impunity, is
there mentioned. In no official report is anything said about the
matter. Why this silence? Bonaparte was not the man to conceal a fact
which would have afforded him so excellent and so allowable a text for
talking about his fortune. If the infected were removed, why not mention
it? Why be silent on so important an event? But it would have been
necessary to confess that heing obliged to have recourse to so painful a
measure was the unavoidable consequence of this unfortunate expedition.
Very disagreeable details must have been entered into; and it was thought
more advisable to be silent on the subject.

But what did Napoleon, himself say on the subject at St. Helena? His
statement there was to the following, effect:--"I ordered a consultation
as to what was best to be done. The report which was made stated that
there were seven or eight men (the question is not about the number) so
dangerously ill that they could not live beyond twenty-four hours, and
would besides infect the rest of the army with the plague. It was
thought it would be an act of charity to anticipate their death a few,
hours."

Then comes the fable of the 500 men of the rear guard, who, it is
pretended,