n was made for the construction of
fortifications at proper points through the whole extent of our coast
and such an augmentation of our naval force as should be well adapted to
both purposes. The laws making this provision were passed in 1815 and
1816, and it has been since the constant effort of the Executive to
carry them into effect.

The advantage of these fortifications and of an augmented naval force in
the extent contemplated, in a point of economy, has been fully
illustrated by a report of the Board of Engineers and Naval
Commissioners lately communicated to Congress, by which it appears that
in an invasion by 20,000 men, with a correspondent naval force, in a
campaign of six months only, the whole expense of the construction of
the works would be defrayed by the difference in the sum necessary to
maintain the force which would be adequate to our defense with the aid
of those works and that which would be incurred without them. The reason
of this difference is obvious. If fortifications are judiciously placed
on our great inlets, as distant from our cities as circumstances will
permit, they will form the only points of attack, and the enemy will be
detained there by a small regular force a sufficient time to enable our
militia to collect and repair to that on which the attack is made. A
force adequate to the enemy, collected at that single point, with
suitable preparation for such others as might be menaced, is all that
would be requisite. But if there were no fortifications, then the enemy
might go where he pleased, and, changing his position and sailing from
place to place, our force must be called out and spread in vast numbers
along the whole coast and on both sides of every bay and river as high
up in each as it might be navigable for ships of war. By these
fortifications, supported by our Navy, to which they would afford like
support, we should present to other powers an armed front from St. Croix
to the Sabine, which would protect in the event of war our whole coast
and interior from invasion; and even in the wars of other powers, in
which we were neutral, they would be found eminently useful, as, by
keeping their public ships at a distance from our cities, peace and
order in them would be preserved and the Government be protected from
insult.

It need scarcely be remarked that these measures have not been resorted
to in a spirit of hostility to other powers. Such a disposition does not
exist toward an