s entrance only useless old guns of a past century,
more likely to cause the death of those who attempted to serve them than
to injure an enemy? How about the Government that deliberately entered
on a war of which the end was perfectly foreseen, and, while seated
safely in office at home, thought the "honour of Spain" sufficiently
vindicated by offering up its navy, already made useless by neglect and
niggardliness, as a sacrifice? Captain Concas Palan points out that even
after it was fully recognised that the retention of Cuba was impossible,
the worst catastrophes might have been avoided. "In place of treating
for peace while the squadron was intact at Santiago, which, as well as
Manila, could have been defended for some time, the Ministers waited to
sue for peace until everything was lost, while it was perfectly well
known beforehand that that result was inevitable." During the whole
time, _manana veremos_ was the rule of action--a to-morrow that never
was to dawn for those whose lives it was intended to sacrifice. Heaven
works no miracles for those who fling themselves against the impossible!

So long ago as 1823, Thomas Jefferson wrote to President Monroe: "The
addition of the island of Cuba to our Confederacy is exactly what is
wanted to round our power as a nation to the point of its utmost
interest." John Quincy Adams went so far as to state that "Cuba
gravitates to the United States as the apple yet hanging on its native
trunk gravitates to the earth which sustains it"--a statement which has
the more force when it is remembered that for over fifty years the Cuban
insurgents had been liberally supplied with arms, ammunition, stores,
and troops from the United States whenever they required them! And this,
not because Cuba was mismanaged by Spain, but because America coveted
her as "the most interesting addition that could be made to our system
of States," to quote Jefferson once more.

Nevertheless, the heroic sons of Spain were offered up as an expiation
for the sins of her political jugglers for generations past. With the
knowledge that America had at least for seventy years been seeking an
excuse for "rounding her power as a nation" by the seizure of Cuba, no
real effort was made to redress the grievances of her native population,
nor to efficiently defend her coasts.

The state of affairs in Manila was still worse. The culpable neglect of
the Government had resulted in the so-called squadron not being
poss