Napoleon are but a terse restatement of those of
Caesar, and the skill of Hannibal at Cannae still holds place as a model
for the concave formation of a battle-line, so have all the decisive
battles of history taken shape from the timely handling of men, in the
exercise of that sound judgment which adapts means to ends, in every
work of life. Thus it is that equally great battles, those in the
highest sense great, have become memorial, although numbers did not
impart value to the struggle; but they were the expression of that skill
and wisdom which would have ensured success, if the opposing armies had
been greater or less.

If a timely fog did aid the retreat of Washington from Brooklyn, in
1776, so did a petty stream, filled to the brim by a midnight shower,
make altogether desperate, if it did not, alone, change, the fortunes of
Napoleon at Waterloo.

If, also, the siege of Yorktown, in 1781, was conducted by few against
few, as compared with modern armies, it is well to note the historical
fact that, at the second siege, in 1861, the same ravine was used by
General Poe (United States Engineers) to connect "parallels," and
thereby save a "regular approach." Numbers did not change relations, but
simply augmented the physical force employed and imperilled.

He who can seize the local, incidental, and seemingly immaterial
elements which enter into all human plans, and convert them into
determining factors, is to be honored; but the man who can so anticipate
the possibilities and risks which lie ahead, that the world counts as a
miracle, or, at least, as marvelous, that which is only the legitimate
result of faith, courage, and skill, is truly great. Washington did it.
His retreat from Long Island was deliberately planned before he had a
conference with his subordinates; and the entire policy and conduct of
his operations at and near New York will defy criticism. To hold the
facts of the issue discussed, right under the light on that military
science (that is, that mental philosophy which does not change with
physical modes and appliances), is simply to bring out clearly the
necessity for the occupation of New York and Brooklyn by Washington in
1776.

The mere statement of the British forces which were available in 1776
will show that if Washington knew, in advance, exactly what he had to
meet, then he had a right to anticipate a successful resistance. As
early as July, 1775, he demanded that the army should be enli