is attributes) involves the idea of Ego or non-Ego in some
shape or other, and as every conceivable Ego or non-Ego is evolved from
this primitive element (I use this word for want of a better one) the
existence of an extra-cosmic god possessing such attributes prior to
this condition is absolutely inconceivable. Though I have been speaking
of this element as the condition of unconsciousness, it is, properly
speaking, the Chidakasam or Chinmatra of the Hindu philosophers which
contains within itself the potentiality of every condition of "Pragna,"
and which results as consciousness on the one hand and the objective
universe on the other, by the operation of its latent Chichakti (the
power which generates thought).

Before proceeding to discuss the nature of Parabrahmam. It is to be
stated that in the opinion of Adwaitees, the Upanishads and the
Brahmasutras fully support their views on the subject. It is distinctly
affirmed in the Upanishads that Parabrahmam, which is but the bare
potentiality of Pragna,* is not an aspect of Pragna or Ego in any shape,
and that it has neither life nor consciousness. The reader will be able
to ascertain that such is really the case on examining the Mundaka and
Mandukya Upanishads. The language used here and there in the Upanishads
is apt to mislead one into the belief that such language points to the
existence of a conscious Iswar. But the necessity for such language
will perhaps be rendered clear from the following considerations.

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* The power or the capacity that gives rise to perception.
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From a close examination of Mill's cosmological theory the difficulty
will be clearly seen referred to above, of satisfactorily accounting for
the generation of conscious states in any human being from the
standpoint of the said theory. It is generally stated that sensations
arise in us from the action of the external objects around us: they are
the effects of impressions made on our senses by the objective world in
which we exist. This is simple enough to an ordinary mind, however
difficult it may be to account for the transformation of a cerebral
nerve-current into a state of consciousness.

But from the standpoint of Mill's theory we have no proof of the
existence of any external object; even the objective existence of our
own senses is not a matter of certainty to us. How, then, are we to
account for and explain the origin of our mental states, if they are the
only