ht make all subsequent effort to act utterly
useless. From the best information at my disposal, I believed (what
was actually the fact) that the addition of the Tennessee Coal and
Iron property would only increase the proportion of the Steel Company's
holdings by about four per cent, making them about sixty-two per cent
instead of about fifty-eight per cent of the total value in the country;
an addition which, by itself, in my judgment (concurred in, not only by
the Attorney-General but by every competent lawyer), worked no change
in the legal status of the Steel corporation. The diminution in the
percentage of holdings, and production, has gone on steadily, and the
percentage is now about ten per cent less than it was ten years ago.
The action was emphatically for the general good. It offered the only
chance for arresting the panic, and it did arrest the panic. I answered
Messrs. Frick and Gary, as set forth in the letter quoted above, to the
effect that I did not deem it my duty to interfere, that is, to forbid
the action which more than anything else in actual fact saved the
situation. The result justified my judgment. The panic was stopped,
public confidence in the solvency of the threatened institution being at
once restored.
Business was vitally helped by what I did. The benefit was not only
for the moment. It was permanent. Particularly was this the case in the
South. Three or four years afterwards I visited Birmingham. Every man
I met, without exception, who was competent to testify, informed me
voluntarily that the results of the action taken had been of the utmost
benefit to Birmingham, and therefore to Alabama, the industry having
profited to an extraordinary degree, not only from the standpoint of the
business, but from the standpoint of the community at large and of the
wage-workers, by the change in ownership. The results of the action I
took were beneficial from every standpoint, and the action itself, at
the time when it was taken, was vitally necessary to the welfare of the
people of the United States.
I would have been derelict in my duty, I would have shown myself a timid
and unworthy public servant, if in that extraordinary crisis I had not
acted precisely as I did act. In every such crisis the temptation to
indecision, to non-action, is great, for excuses can always be found for
non-action, and action means risk and the certainty of blame to the man
who acts. But if the man is worth his salt he
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