here give the part of
its content which relates to Education only in the form of educational
maxims. The principal categories of Ethics in the domain of morality are
the ideas of Duty, Virtue, and Conscience. Education must lay stress on
the truth that nothing in the world has any absolute value except will
guided by the right.

Sec. 146. Thence follows (1) the maxim relating to the idea of Duty, that
we must accustom the pupil to unconditional obedience to it, so that he
shall perform it for no other reason than that it is duty. It is true
that the performance of a duty may bring with it externally a result
agreeable or disagreeable, useful or harmful; but the consideration of
such connection ought never to determine us. This moral demand, though
it may appear to be excessive severity, is the absolute foundation of
all genuine ethical practice. All "highest happiness theories," however
finely spun they may be, when taken as a guide for life, lead at last to
Sophistry, and this to contradictions which ruin the life.

Sec. 147. (2) Virtue must make actual what duty commands, or, rather, the
actualizing of duty is Virtue. And here we must say next, then, that the
principal things to be considered under Virtue are (_a_) the dialectic
of particular virtues, (_b_) renunciation, and (_c_) character.

Sec. 148. (_a_) From the dialectic of particular virtues there follows the
educational maxim that we must practise all virtues with equal
faithfulness, for all together constitute an ethical system complete in
itself, in which no one is indifferent to another.

--Morality should recognize no distinction of superiority among the
different virtues. They reciprocally determine each other. There is no
such thing as one virtue which shines out above the others, and still
less should we have any special gift for virtue. The pupil must be
taught to recognize no great and no small in the virtues, for that one
which may at first sight seem small is inseparably connected with that
which is seemingly the greatest. Many virtues are attractive by reason
of their external consequences, as e.g. industry because of success in
business, worthy conduct because of the respect paid to it, charity
because of the pleasure attending it; but man should not practise these
virtues because he enjoys them: he must devote the same amount of
self-sacrifice and of assiduity to those virtues which (as Christ said)
are to be performed in secret.--

--It is