of shame and
dissipation.

Not till the army had become a laughing stock to the weakest European
power did the sultans perceive the necessity of military reform. Selim
III established a school for artillery and naval officers, and engaged
Europeans, especially Frenchmen, as instructors in military science. We
can readily comprehend the degeneracy of the Turkish army, when we
remember that since the establishment of the school at Sulitzi for
engineers, the Turks have learned from foreign teachers military tactics
of which their own ancestors were the inventors, and which had been
forgotten, although full accounts of them lay hidden in musty volumes in
their military archives.

Foreign officers were at first regarded with contempt by Turkish
soldiers, whose unconquerable pride has ever proved a great impediment
to the regeneration of the empire. Moslem talent was not equal to the
exigencies that arose from the impolitic measures of Mahmoud. We find a
parallel case in Russia. Had Peter trusted to Muscovite genius to form
and command the troops which superseded the Strelitzes, Charles XII
would have quartered in the Kremlin.

Kutchuk Husseyin, the relative and favorite of Selim, made valuable
additions to the navy in which his master took such pride. Husseyin, who
had the welfare of his country at heart, was liberal and disinterested.
Vested with the office of captain pasha, he sent to Greece for
architects and engineers, with whose assistance he fortified Stamboul,
Sinope, and Rhodes; he built arsenals and extensive docks, which he
supplied with the necessary equipments of a powerful fleet. In a short
time, twenty sail of the line, constructed on the newest European
models, rode at anchor within sight of his palace. He also erected
barracks for the troops, and greatly improved the naval school. The
sudden death of Selim paralyzed the navy, which soon resumed its
accustomed languor.

The events of 1821, in which the Turkish fleet was defeated by armed
merchant vessels of Greece, gave a fresh impulse to the navy.
Experienced officers were placed in command, who, as they grew in
strength, grew in confidence, and trusted more to their own resources
than to the protection of Allah. Six years after the defeat, the navy
was in a state of greater practical efficiency than at any other time.
After a protracted struggle of five years it had gained the undisputed
supremacy of the Archipelago; and had it not been for the disastro