nemy would have filled the mine with
powder, and would explode it as they advanced, refused to move. The
remaining men of the flank companies of the 22nd stepped forward
but, as they were too few to attack so considerable a number of the
enemy, the 12th and 15th Sepoy Regiments were called to the front,
and these advanced gallantly.

The enemy were driven from the trench at the point of the bayonet.
The ditch, however, had again been flooded, and was found to be
impassable; but there was a bastion to the right that had been
damaged by the breaching guns, and the troops at once made for
this. A few men of the 12th managed to climb up, and planted the
flag of their regiment on it but, as only one could mount at a
time, and the Jats were swarming down upon them, they were
recalled; and the force again drew off, having lost, in killed and
wounded, nearly nine hundred men. Notwithstanding the terrible
losses that had been suffered, General Lake persevered in his
intention to carry the place at the point of the bayonet; and on
the following day the batteries opened their fire on the bastion
that had been nearly carried by the 12th Native Infantry.

The position had become serious. The cavalry had, a fortnight or
three weeks before, defeated those of the rajah and his allies with
heavy loss, and brought in a convoy; and Ameer Khan, who had only
joined the Rajah of Bhurtpoor in the hope of plunder, had deserted
his ally and ridden off, with his following and a large body of
Pindarees, with the intention of devastating and plundering the
district of Rohilcund. Three regiments of British cavalry, under
General Smith; and as many of native horse, with artillery,
followed on his track and, after a pursuit of three weeks, at last
came up with him, annihilated his infantry and captured his guns.
His cavalry, however, for the most part escaped, as the horses of
the pursuers were completely worn out.

They returned to the British camp, after more than a month's
absence, from a chase extending over seven hundred miles.

Their absence had greatly increased the difficulties in the British
camp. Without their protection, the danger to which convoys were
exposed was great. Provisions were running short in camp, the
ammunition was almost exhausted, and numbers of the guns were
rendered unserviceable. These circumstances afforded the only
excuse that can be made for a fresh attack upon Bhurtpoor.

It was even more disastrous than those