; which would be highly absurd. Let us first consider this point
in the sense of taste, and the rather as the faculty in question has
taken its name from that sense. All men are agreed to call vinegar sour,
honey sweet, and aloes bitter; and as they are all agreed in finding
those qualities in those objects, they do not in the least differ
concerning their effects with regard to pleasure and pain. They all
concur in calling sweetness pleasant, and sourness and bitterness
unpleasant. Here there is no diversity in their sentiments; and that
there is not, appears fully from the consent of all men in the metaphors
which are taken, from the souse of taste. A sour temper, bitter
expressions, bitter curses, a bitter fate, are terms well and strongly
understood by all. And we are altogether as well understood when we say,
a sweet disposition, a sweet person, a sweet condition and the like. It
is confessed, that custom and some other causes have made many
deviations from the natural pleasures or pains which belong to these
several tastes; but then the power of distinguishing between the natural
and the acquired relish remains to the very last. A man frequently comes
to prefer the taste of tobacco to that of sugar, and the flavor of
vinegar to that of milk; but this makes no confusion in tastes, whilst
he is sensible that the tobacco and vinegar are not sweet, and whilst he
knows that habit alone has reconciled his palate to these alien
pleasures. Even with such a person we may speak, and with sufficient
precision, concerning tastes. But should any man be found who declares,
that to him tobacco has a taste like sugar, and that he cannot
distinguish between milk and vinegar; or that tobacco and vinegar are
sweet, milk bitter, and sugar sour; we immediately conclude that the
organs of this man are out of order, and that his palate is utterly
vitiated. We are as far from conferring with such a person upon tastes,
as from reasoning concerning the relations of quantity with one who
should deny that all the parts together were equal to the whole. We do
not call a man of this kind wrong in his notions, but absolutely mad.
Exceptions of this sort, in either way, do not at all impeach our
general rule, nor make us conclude that men have various principles
concerning the relations of quantity or the taste of things. So that
when it is said, taste cannot be disputed, it can only mean, that no one
can strictly answer what pleasure or pain some