erous ally as she insisted on having hostages to
ensure her repayment. A venal spirit was evident in every quarter. As
the troops made their way over the Jura their behaviour showed that
the late splendid booty had affected them. Plunder was their aim. When
Rene reviewed these fresh arrivals from Basel, one of his attending
officers was Oswald von Thierstein, late governor of Alsace.[15]
Disgraced by Sigismund he had passed over to the Duke of Lorraine, who
appointed him marshal.

On that January 4th, a Saturday, Charles held a council meeting. The
opinion of the wisest, already given on previous occasions, was urged
again:

"Do not risk battle. Rene is poor. If there are no immediate
engagements, his mercenaries will abandon him for lack of pay.
Raise the siege and depart for Flanders and Luxemburg. The army
can rest and be increased. Then at the approach of spring it will
be easy to fall upon Rene deprived of his troops."

Charles was absolutely deaf to these arguments. He was determined on
facing the issue at once. Leaving a small force to sustain the siege,
he ordered the camp to be broken on the evening of the 4th and a
movement made towards St.-Nicolas. He selected a ground favourable
for the manipulation of a large body, and placed his artillery on a
plateau situated between Jarville and Neuville. It was not a good
position, being hedged in on the right and in front by woods which
could conceal the movements of a foe without impeding them. Only one
way of retreat was open--towards Metz, whose bishop was Charles's
last ally. But to reach Metz, it was necessary to cross several small
streams and deceptive marshes, half frozen as they were, besides the
river Meurthe, a serious obstacle with the garrison of Nancy on the
flank. In short, there was ample reason to dread surprise, while
in case of defeat a terrible catastrophe was more than possible.
Curiously, the precise kind of difficulties which beset the field of
Morat were repeated here--proof that Charles had not the qualities of
a general who could learn by experience.[16]

The exact force at his disposal on this occasion has been variously
estimated. Considering the ravages of the sanguinary skirmishes during
the siege, and of the cold, it is probable that the actual combatants
did not number more than ten thousand, all told. And only half of
these were of any value--two thousand men under Galeotto, and
three thousand Burgundians comman