lest other questions
affecting the slave and non-slave-holding States might be brought on the
boards, and again disturb the bonds of union.

Another very remarkable--and in a Republic anomalous--feature in the
government, is the power of the President, who, by the Constitution, is
enabled during his four years' tenure of office to rule in total
opposition to the majority, obstructing all the measures they may bring
forward, unless the majority amounts to two-thirds in both Houses of
Congress.

Article I., section 7, clause 2, runs thus:--"Every bill which shall
have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before
it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if
he approves, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his
objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall
enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to
re-consider it. If after such re-consideration two-thirds of that House
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be
re-considered, and if approved by two-thirds of that House, it shall
become a law," &c.

This power of the President has been used by Washington, Jackson, Tyler,
and Polk; particularly by Tyler, who opposed the wishes of the majority
even when those wishes were backed by his own ministry. During the
discussions on the Constitution, many of the wisest heads at that
eventful period desired to establish the Presidency for life, but
eventually the term of four years was agreed upon; and if such powers of
obstructing the wishes of a majority were to accompany the office, it
certainly was a prudent conclusion they arrived at. In a densely
populated community like Great Britain, such powers, whether in the
hands of the sovereign or the ministers, would produce a revolution in
much less time than four years. It may, however, be questioned, whether
these powers are not productive of evil, by rendering necessary such
frequent elections for the Presidency. On this point, Mr. Justice Story
states: "The inconvenience of such frequently recurring elections of the
chief magistrate, by generating factions, combining intrigues, and
agitating the public mind, seems not hitherto to have attracted as much
attention, as it deserves." And Chancellor Kent remarks, that "the
election of a supreme executive magistrate for a whole nation affects so