hn Minor Botts of a
conversation with Lincoln April 7, 1862. No two of the versions entirely
agree. Baldwin insists that Lincoln made no offer of any sort; while'
Botts in his testimony before the Committee on Reconstruction says that
Lincoln told him that he had told Baldwin that he was so anxious "for
the preservation of the peace of this country and to save Virginia
and the other Border States from going out that (he would) take the
responsibility of evacuating Fort Sumter, and take the chances of
negotiating with the Cotton States." Baldwin's language before the
committee is a little curious and has been thought disingenuous.
Boutwell, I, 66. However, practically no one in this connection has
considered the passage in the Hay MS or the statement in Riddle. Putting
these together and remembering the general situation of the first week
of April there arises a very plausible argument for accepting the main
fact in Baldwin's version of his conference and concluding that Botts
either misunderstood Lincoln (as Baldwin says he did) or got the matter
twisted in memory. A further bit of plausibility is the guess that
Lincoln talked with Botts not only of the interview with Baldwin but
also of the earlier interview mentioned by Riddle and that the two
became confused in recollection.

To venture on an assumption harmonizing these confusions. When Lincoln
came to Washington, being still in his delusion that slavery was the
issue and therefore that the crisis was "artificial," he was willing
to make almost any concession, and freely offered to evacuate Sumter if
thereby he could induce Virginia to drop the subject of secession. Even
later, when he was beginning to appreciate the real significance of the
moment, he was still willing to evacuate Sumter if the issue would not
be pushed further in the Border States, that is, if Virginia would not
demand a definite concession of the right of secession. Up to this point
I can not think that he had taken seriously Seward's proposed convention
of the States and the general discussion of permanent Federal relations
that would be bound to ensue. But now he makes his fateful discovery
that the issue is not slavery but sovereignty. He sees that Virginia
is in dead earnest on this issue and that a general convention will
necessarily involve a final discussion of sovereignty in the United
States and that the price of the Virginia Amendment will be the
concession of the right of secession. On