powers of my
understanding can carry me, that the phenomena of mind are governed by
laws altogether as inevitable as the phenomena of matter, and that the
decisions of our will are always in obedience to the impulse of the
strongest motive.

The consequences of the principle implanted in our nature, by which men
of every creed, when they descend into the scene of busy life, pronounce
themselves and their fellow-mortals to be free agents, are sufficiently
memorable.

From hence there springs what we call conscience in man, and a sense of
praise or blame due to ourselves and others for the actions we perform.

How poor, listless and unenergetic would all our performances be,
but for this sentiment! It is in vain that I should talk to myself or
others, of the necessity of human actions, of the connection between
cause and effect, that all industry, study and mental discipline will
turn to account, and this with infinitely more security on the principle
of necessity, than on the opposite doctrine, every thing I did would
be without a soul. I should still say, Whatever I may do, whether it be
right or wrong, I cannot help it; wherefore then should I trouble
the master-spirit within me? It is either the calm feeling of
self-approbation, or the more animated swell of the soul, the quick
beatings of the pulse, the enlargement of the heart, the glory sparkling
in the eye, and the blood flushing into the cheek, that sustains me in
all my labours. This turns the man into what we conceive of a God, arms
him with prowess, gives him a more than human courage, and inspires him
with a resolution and perseverance that nothing can subdue.

In the same manner the love or hatred, affection or alienation, we
entertain for our fellow-men, is mainly referable for its foundation
to the "delusive sense of liberty." "We approve of a sharp knife rather
than a blunt one, because its capacity is greater. We approve of its
being employed in carving food, rather than in maiming men or other
animals, because that application of its capacity is preferable. But
all approbation or preference is relative to utility or general good. A
knife is as capable as a man, of being employed in purposes of utility;
and the one is no more free than the other as to its employment. The
mode in which a knife is made subservient to these purposes, is by
material impulse. The mode in which a man is made subservient, is
by inducement and persuasion. But both are equall