heism.' We
then wrote thus: 'It is spirit only that animates, informs, and shapes
the whole universe. Wherever law prevails (and where does it not?),
there is intelligence, spirit, soul, acting to sustain it, during every
moment of its operation.' Can anyone seriously question the correctness,
and even the entire orthodoxy of this statement? In truth, we do not
understand that our contributor himself denies it absolutely, but only
in a qualified sense, as we shall presently show. Of course, it could be
no other spirit than the Deity, to which our language would be
applicable; and we do not see how it can in any way derogate from His
attributes, to represent him as acting, by an exertion of spiritual
power, to sustain and uphold his creation, during every moment of its
existence.

Nor can we comprehend the pertinence of our contributor's disquisition
on the great question of free will and necessity, as applicable to our
ideas of the relations existing between mind and matter. 'Spirit acts
independently of God,' says he. We might well question the truth of this
assertion; but we may equally well admit it, so far as any inference may
be drawn against the positions we have assumed. The question is not
whether the soul of man is compelled to action according to the law of
its creation, or is permitted by spontaneous choice to follow its own
independent will. This is not point of disagreement; for we have
expressed no opinion on this subject, nor upon any other which involves
it. On the contrary, we took the question to be simply whether there can
be, in the nature of things, any relations of reciprocal influence and
mutual cooeperation between mind and matter. If this be not the question
at issue, both our contributor and ourselves are engaged in a fruitless
attempt to enlighten each other. We are well aware that his digression
from the main argument to the disputed question of free will, is made
for the purpose of attempting to show that all spiritual agency must be
like that which he claims for the soul of man--that is to say, it must
have a free will, 'constantly departing from its normal state,' acting
irregularly and according to the freaks of its own spontaneity. And
because there is no such caprice and irregularity in the operation of
the laws of nature, the inference is drawn that they cannot be the
evidences of spiritual power, in the forces which they govern.

Upon this point there seems to be a radical difference