lowly approaching Cawnpore in detachments, with the evident
intention of surrounding the place. On the 17th two bodies of troops
were pushed on to Shuli and Shirajpur, within fifteen miles of the
city, and a little less than that distance from each other. Windham
thought that if he could manage to surprise either of these, he could
prevent the enemy from concentrating, and he drew up a scheme for
giving effect to this plan, which he submitted for the approval of the
Commander-in-Chief. No reply came, and after waiting a week he gave up
all idea of attempting to surprise the detachments, and determined to
try and arrest the rebels' advance by attacking the main body, still
some distance off. Accordingly he broke up his camp, and marched six
miles along the Kalpi road, on the same day that the Gwalior force
moved some distance nearer to Cawnpore. The next morning, the 25th,
the enemy advanced to Pandu Naddi, within three miles of Windham's
camp.
Windham now found himself in a very critical position. With only 1,200
Infantry[6] and eight light guns, he was opposed to Tantia Topi with
an army of 25,000 men and forty guns. He had to choose whether he
would fight these enormous odds or retire: he decided that to fight
was the least of the two evils, and he was so far successful that
he drove back that portion of the opposing force immediately in
his front, and captured three guns; but being unable to press his
advantage on account of the paucity of men and the total absence of
Cavalry, he had perforce to fall back--a grievous necessity. He was
followed the whole way, insulted and jeered at, by the rebel horsemen.
The result of the day was to give confidence to the wily Mahratta
leader; he pushed on to Cawnpore, and attacked Windham with such
vehemence that by nightfall on the 28th the British troops were driven
inside the entrenchment, having had 315 men killed and wounded, and
having lost all their baggage and camp equipage.
Windham undoubtedly laid himself open to censure. His defence was
that, had he received the Commander-in-Chief's authority to carry out
his plan for surprising the rebels, he would certainly have broken up
their army, and the disaster could not have occurred. But surely when
he decided that circumstances had so changed since Sir Colin's orders
were given as to justify him in disregarding them, he should have
acted on his own responsibility, and taken such steps as appeared to
him best, instead of app
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