he present
state of things for even a short period will add enormously to the
time and labor and expenditure necessary to bring about the industrial
recuperation of the island. It is therefore fervently hoped on all
grounds that earnest efforts for healing the breach between Spain and
the insurgent Cubans upon the lines above indicated may be at once
inaugurated and pushed to an immediate and successful issue. The
friendly offices of the United States, either in the manner above
outlined or in any other way consistent with our Constitution and laws,
will always be at the disposal of either party.

Whatever circumstances may arise, our policy and our interests would
constrain us to object to the acquisition of the island or an
interference with its control by any other power.

It should be added that it can not be reasonably assumed that the
hitherto expectant attitude of the United States will be indefinitely
maintained. While we are anxious to accord all due respect to the
sovereignty of Spain, we can not view the pending conflict in all its
features and properly apprehend our inevitably close relations to it and
its possible results without considering that by the course of events we
may be drawn into such an unusual and unprecedented condition as will
fix a limit to our patient waiting for Spain to end the contest, either
alone and in her own way or with our friendly cooperation.

When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection
has become manifest and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is
extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a
hopeless struggle for its reestablishment has degenerated into a strife
which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and
the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a
situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty
of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly
hesitate to recognize and discharge. Deferring the choice of ways and
methods until the time for action arrives, we should make them depend
upon the precise conditions then existing; and they should not be
determined upon without giving careful heed to every consideration
involving our honor and interest or the international duty we owe to
Spain. Until we face the contingencies suggested or the situation is by
other incidents imperatively changed we should continue in the line of
conduc