resent, if a man can view his own country and all other countries
from the same level with tepid indifference, it is wise to distrust
him, just as it is wise to distrust the man who can take the same
dispassionate view of his wife and his mother. However broad and deep
a man's sympathies, however intense his activities, he need have no
fear that they will be cramped by love of his native land.

Now, this does not mean in the least that a man should not wish to do
good outside of his native land. On the contrary, just as I think that
the man who loves his family is more apt to be a good neighbor than
the man who does not, so I think that the most useful member of the
family of nations is normally a strongly patriotic nation. So far from
patriotism being inconsistent with a proper regard for the rights of
other nations, I hold that the true patriot, who is as jealous of the
national honor as a gentleman is of his own honor, will be careful to
see that the nation neither inflicts nor suffers wrong, just as a
gentleman scorns equally to wrong others or to suffer others to wrong
him. I do not for one moment admit that political morality is
different from private morality, that a promise made on the stump
differs from a promise made in private life. I do not for one moment
admit that a man should act deceitfully as a public servant in his
dealings with other nations, any more than that he should act
deceitfully in his dealings as a private citizen with other private
citizens. I do not for one moment admit that a nation should treat
other nations in a different spirit from that in which an honorable
man would treat other men.

In practically applying this principle to the two sets of cases there
is, of course, a great practical difference to be taken into account.
We speak of international law; but international law is something
wholly different from private or municipal law, and the capital
difference is that there is a sanction for the one and no sanction for
the other; that there is an outside force which compels individuals to
obey the one, while there is no such outside force to compel
obedience as regards the other. International law will, I believe, as
the generations pass, grow stronger and stronger until in some way or
other there develops the power to make it respected. But as yet it is
only in the first formative period. As yet, as a rule, each nation is
of necessity obliged to judge for itself in matters of vital