ong such a line, to
protect and defend it. The enemy, relieved from the pressure of our arms
on his coasts and in the populous parts of the interior, would direct
his attention to this line, and, selecting an isolated post for attack,
would concentrate his forces upon it. This would be a condition of
affairs which the Mexicans, pursuing their favorite system of guerrilla
warfare, would probably prefer to any other. Were we to assume a
defensive attitude on such a line, all the advantages of such a state of
war would be on the side of the enemy. We could levy no contributions
upon him, or in any other way make him feel the pressure of the war, but
must remain inactive and await his approach, being in constant
uncertainty at what point on the line or at what time he might make an
assault. He may assemble and organize an overwhelming force in the
interior on his own side of the line, and, concealing his purpose, make
a sudden assault upon some one of our posts so distant from any other as
to prevent the possibility of timely succor or reenforcements, and in
this way our gallant Army would be exposed to the danger of being cut
off in detail; or if by their unequaled bravery and prowess everywhere
exhibited during this war they should repulse the enemy, their numbers
stationed at any one post may be too small to pursue him. If the enemy
be repulsed in one attack, he would have nothing to do but to retreat to
his own side of the line, and, being in no fear of a pursuing army, may
reenforce himself at leisure for another attack on the same or some
other post. He may, too, cross the line between our posts, make rapid
incursions into the country which we hold, murder the inhabitants,
commit depredations on them, and then retreat to the interior before a
sufficient force can be concentrated to pursue him. Such would probably
be the harassing character of a mere defensive war on our part. If our
forces when attacked, or threatened with attack, be permitted to cross
the line, drive back the enemy, and conquer him, this would be again to
invade the enemy's country after having lost all the advantages of the
conquests we have already made by having voluntarily abandoned them.

To hold such a line successfully and in security it is far from being
certain that it would not require as large an army as would be necessary
to hold all the conquests we have already made and to continue the
prosecution of the war in the heart of the enemy's c