believe was capable
of being generalized into a voluntarist theory of all knowledge was soon
shown in Dr. Schiller's _Axioms as Postulates_.

CHAPTER IV

THE DILEMMAS OF DOGMATISM

Every man, probably, is by instinct a dogmatist. He feels perfectly sure
that he knows some things, and is right about them against the world.
Whatever he believes in he does not doubt, but holds to be
self-evidently or indisputably true. His naive dogmatism, moreover,
spontaneously assumes that his truth is universal and shared by all
others.

If now he could live like a fakir, wholly wrapped in a cloud of his own
imaginings, and nothing ever happened to disappoint his expectations, to
jar upon his prejudices, and to convict him of error; if he never held
converse with anyone who took a different view and controverted him, his
dogmatism would be lifelong and incurable. But as he lives socially, he
has in practice to outgrow it, and this lands him in a serious
theoretical dilemma. He has to learn to live with others who differ from
him in their dogmatizing. Social life plainly would become impossible
if all rigidly insisted on the absolute rightness of their own beliefs
and the absolute wrongness of all others.

So compromises have to be made to get at a common 'truth.' It must be
recognized that not everything which is believed to be 'knowledge' is
knowledge. In fact, it is safer to assume that none have knowledge,
though all think they have; to say fact, men only have 'opinions,' which
may be nearer to or farther from 'the truth,' but are not of necessity
as unquestionable as they seem to be. Out of this concession to the
social life arise three problems. How are 'opinions' to be compared with
each other, and how is the extent of their 'truth' or 'error' to be
determined? How is the belief in absolute truth to be interpreted and
discounted? How is the penitent dogmatist, once he has allowed doubt to
corrupt his self-confidence, to be stopped from doubting all things and
turning sceptic?

As regards the first problem, the first question is whether we shall try
to _test_ opinions and to arrive at a standard of value by which to
measure them by comparing the opinions themselves with one another, or
shall presume that there must be some absolute standard which alone is
truly true, whether we are aware of it or not. The former view is
_relativism_, the latter is _absolutism_, in the matter of truth.

Now, there can be no doubt t