. to-day.

In all my communications and interviews with you since you took command
of the Army of the Potomac I have advised a forward movement across the
Rappahannock. At our interview at Warrenton I urged that you should cross
by the fords above Fredericksburg rather than to fall down to that
place; and when I left you at Warrenton it was understood that at least
a considerable part of your army would cross by the fords, and I so
represented to the President. It was this modification of the plan
proposed by you that I telegraphed you had received his approval. When
the attempt at Fredericksburg was abandoned, I advised you to renew the
attempt at some other point, either in whole or in part, to turn the
enemy's works, or to threaten their wings or communications; in other
words, to keep the enemy occupied till a favorable opportunity offered to
strike a decisive blow. I particularly advised you to use your cavalry
and light artillery upon his communications, and attempt to cut off his
supplies and engage him at an advantage.

In all our interviews I have urged that our first object was, not
Richmond, but the defeat or scattering of Lee's army, which threatened
Washington and the line of the upper Potomac. I now recur to these things
simply to remind you of the general views which I have expressed, and
which I still hold.

The circumstances of the case, however, have somewhat changed since the
early part of November. The chances of an extended line of operations
are now, on account of the advanced season, much less than then. But
the chances are still in our favor to meet and defeat the enemy on the
Rappahannock, if we can effect a crossing in a position where we can meet
the enemy on favorable or even equal terms. I therefore still advise a
movement against him. The character of that movement, however, must depend
upon circumstances which may change any day and almost any hour. If the
enemy should concentrate his forces at the place you have selected for a
crossing, make it a feint and try another place. Again, the circumstances
at the time may be such as to render an attempt to cross the entire
army not advisable. In that case, theory suggests that, while the enemy
concentrates at that point, advantages can be gained by crossing smaller
forces at other points to cut off his lines, destroy his communication,
and capture his rear-guards, outposts, etc. The great object is to occupy
the enemy to prevent his making lar