here will be, of course, an agreement in the
imaginations as in the senses of men. There being this agreement, it
follows that in all cases, in our lightest amusements as well as in our
most serious actions and engagements of life, we must regulate our
affections of every kind by that of others. The well-disciplined mind
acknowledges this authority, and submits its own opinion to the public
voice.

It is from knowing what are the general feelings and passions of mankind
that we acquire a true idea of what imagination is; though it appears as
if we had nothing to do but to consult our own particular sensations, and
these were sufficient to ensure us from all error and mistake.

A knowledge of the disposition and character of the human mind can be
acquired only by experience: a great deal will be learned, I admit, by a
habit of examining what passes in our bosoms, what are our own motives of
action, and of what kind of sentiments we are conscious on any occasion.
We may suppose a uniformity, and conclude that the same effect will be
produced by the same cause in the minds of others. This examination will
contribute to suggest to us matters of inquiry; but we can never be sure
that our own sensations are true and right till they are confirmed by
more extensive observation.

One man opposing another determines nothing but a general union of minds,
like a general combination of the forces of all mankind, makes a strength
that is irresistible. In fact, as he who does not know himself does not
know others, so it may be said with equal truth, that he who does not
know others knows himself but very imperfectly.

A man who thinks he is guarding himself against Prejudices by resisting
the authority of others, leaves open every avenue to singularity, vanity,
self-conceit, obstinacy, and many other vices, all tending to warp the
judgment and prevent the natural operation of his faculties.

This submission to others is a deference which we owe, and indeed are
forced involuntarily to pay.

In fact we are never satisfied with our opinions till they are ratified
and confirmed by the suffrages of the rest of mankind. We dispute and
wrangle for ever; we endeavour to get men to come to us when we do not go
to them.

He therefore who is acquainted with the works which have pleased
different ages and different countries, and has formed his opinion on
them, has more materials and more means of knowing what is analogous to
the min