nd the prince, so, I dare say, his grace was never
displeased with the part I had in it, and I hope will not forget it.

These things I mention upon this account, and no other, viz., to state
the obligation I have been in all along to her majesty personally, and
to my first benefactor principally; by which I say, I think I was at
least obliged not to act against them, even in those things which I
might not approve. Whether I have acted with them further than I ought,
shall be spoken of by itself.

Having said thus much of the obligations laid on me, and the persons by
whom, I have this only to add, that I think no man will say, a subject
could be under greater bonds to his prince, or a private person to a
minister of state; and I shall ever preserve this principle, that an
honest man cannot be ungrateful to his benefactor.

But let no man run away now with the notion, that I am now intending to
plead the obligation that was laid upon me from her majesty, or from any
other person, to justify my doing anything that is not otherwise to be
justified in itself.

Nothing would be more injurious than such a construction; and therefore
I capitulate for so much justice as to explain myself by this
declaration, viz., that I only speak of those obligations as binding me
to a negative conduct, not to fly in the face of, or concern myself in
disputes with those to whom I was under such obligations, although I
might not, in my judgment, join in many things that were done. No
obligation could excuse me in calling evil good, or good evil; but I am
of the opinion, that I might justly think myself obliged to defend what
I thought was to be defended, and to be silent in anything which I might
think was not.

If this is a crime, I must plead guilty, and give in the history of my
obligation above mentioned as an extenuation at least, if not a
justification of my conduct.

Suppose a man's father was guilty of several things unlawful and
unjustifiable; a man may heartily detest the unjustifiable thing, and
yet it ought not to be expected that he should expose his father. I
think the case on my side exactly the same, nor can the duty to a parent
be more strongly obliging than the obligation laid on me; but I must
allow the case on the other side not the same.

And this brings me to the affirmative, and inquire what the matters of
fact are; what I have done, or have not done, on account of these
obligations which I am under.

It is a