the first section of the _Traite des
sensations_. To show the thoroughness of the treatment it will be enough
to quote the headings of the chief remaining chapters: "Of the Ideas of
a Man limited to the Sense of Smell," "Of a Man limited to the Sense of
Hearing," "Of Smell and Hearing combined," "Of Taste by itself, and of
Taste combined with Smell and Hearing," "Of a Man limited to the Sense
of Sight." In the second section of the treatise Condillac invests his
statue with the sense of touch, which first informs it of the existence
of external objects. In a very careful and elaborate analysis, he
distinguishes the various elements in our tactile experiences--the
touching of one's own body, the touching of objects other than one's own
body, the experience of movement, the exploration of surfaces by the
hands: he traces the growth of the statue's perceptions of extension,
distance and shape. The third section deals with the combination of
touch with the other senses. The fourth section deals with the desires,
activities and ideas of an isolated man who enjoys possession of all the
senses; and ends with observations on a "wild boy" who was found living
among bears in the forests of Lithuania. The conclusion of the whole
work is that in the natural order of things everything has its source in
sensation, and yet that this source is not equally abundant in all men;
men differ greatly in the degree of vividness with which they feel; and,
finally, that man is nothing but what he has acquired; all innate
faculties and ideas are to be swept away. The last dictum suggests the
difference that has been made to this manner of psychologizing by modern
theories of evolution and heredity.

Condillac's work on politics and history, contained, for the most part,
in his _Cours d'etudes_, offers few features of interest, except so far
as it illustrates his close affinity to English thought: he had not the
warmth and imagination to make a good historian. In logic, on which he
wrote extensively, he is far less successful than in psychology. He
enlarges with much iteration, but with few concrete examples, upon the
supremacy of the analytic method; argues that reasoning consists in the
substitution of one proposition for another which is identical with it;
and lays it down that science is the same thing as a well-constructed
language, a proposition which in his _Langue des calculs_ he tries to
prove by the example of arithmetic. His logic has