understand that we shall join
them in not acknowledging Napoleon III.[44] Objectionable as this
appellation no doubt is, it may hardly be worth offending France and
her Ruler by refusing to recognise it, when it is of _such_ importance
to prevent their considering themselves the aggrieved party; any
attempt to dictate to France the style of her Ruler would strengthen
Louis Napoleon's position; our object should be to leave France alone,
as long as she is not aggressive.

All of this should be well weighed.

[Footnote 44: Louis Napoleon himself claimed no hereditary
right to the Imperial dignity, but only that conferred by
election: he acknowledged as national all the acts which
had taken place since 1815, such as the reigns of the
later Bourbons and of Louis Philippe. (See _Memoirs of an
ex-Minister_.)]

[Pageheading: NATIONAL DEFENCES]

_The Prince Albert to Viscount Hardinge._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _8th November 1852._

MY DEAR LORD HARDINGE,--In reference to our conversation of yesterday,
and the Queen's request to Lord Derby that he should call upon the
different departments of the Admiralty, Army, Ordnance, and Home
Office to furnish a report as to how far the measures begun last
spring to put our defences in a state of efficiency have been carried
out, and what remains to be done in that direction--I beg now to
address you in writing. The object the Queen wishes to obtain is, to
receive an account which will show what means we have _really_ at our
disposal for purposes of defence, _ready for action_ at the shortest
possible notice, and what remains to be done to put us into a state of
security, what the supply of the wants may cost (approximately), and
what time it would require.

As it will be not only convenient but necessary that the Horse Guards
and Ordnance should consult together and combine their deliberations,
I beg this letter to be understood to apply as well to Lord Raglan
as to yourself, and that you would meet and give the answer to the
Queen's questions conjointly.

(_A detailed list follows._)

These questions would all present themselves at the moment when we
received the intelligence of a threatened _coup de main_ on the part
of Louis Napoleon, when it would be too late to remedy any deficiency.
The public would be quite ready to give the necessary money for our
armament, but they feel with justice that it is unfair to ask them for
large sums and then alway