thing more than a reflection of French revolutionary
principles be discerned; the rights of man and republican doctrine
were attractive subjects of debate in many cities throughout the
peninsula, but there was little of that fierce devotion to their
realization so prevalent beyond the Alps.
The sagacity of Bonaparte saw his account in these conditions. Being
a professed republican, he could announce himself as the regenerator
of society, and the liberator of a people. If, as has been supposed,
he already dreamed of a throne, where could one be so easily founded
with the certainty of its endurance? As a conqueror he would have a
divided, helpless, and wealthy people at his feet. If the old flame of
Corsican ambition were not yet extinguished, he felt perhaps that he
could wreak the vengeance of a defeated and angry people upon Genoa,
their oppressor for ages.
His preparations began as early as the autumn of 1795, when, with
Carnot's assistance, the united Pyrenean and Italian armies were
directed to the old task of opening the roads through the mountains
and by the sea-shore into Lombardy and central Italy. They won the
battle of Loano, which secured the Maritime Alps once more; but a long
winter amid these inclement peaks had left the army wretched and
destitute of every necessity. It had been difficult throughout that
winter to maintain even the Army of the Interior in the heart of
France; the only chance for that of Italy was movement. The completed
plan of action was forwarded from Paris in January. But, as has been
told, Scherer, the commanding general, and his staff were outraged,
refusing to consider its suggestions, either those for supplying their
necessities in Lombardy, or those for the daring and venturesome
operations necessary to reach that goal.
Bonaparte, who could invent such schemes, alone could realize them;
and the task was intrusted to him. For the next ten weeks no sort of
preparation was neglected. The nearly empty chest of the Directory was
swept clean; from that source the new commander received forty-seven
thousand five hundred francs in cash, and drafts for twenty thousand
more; forced loans for considerable sums were made in Toulon and
Marseilles; and Salicetti levied contributions of grain and forage in
Genoa according to the plan which had been preconcerted between him
and the general in their Jacobin days. The army which Bonaparte
finally set in motion was therefore a fine engine of w
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