nts of horse,
was directed to move to the right and turn the enemy's left. His route
was through the forest for two miles to the road coming from the Sabine.
The enemy's left outflanked, he was to attack from the south and west,
keeping his regiments of horse well to his right, and Walker would
attack on his left. This was explained to Churchill, and Mr. T.J.
Williams, formerly sheriff of De Soto parish, and acquainted with every
road in the vicinity, was sent with him as a guide. On Walker's left,
near the road from Mansfield, Major Brent had twelve guns in the wood,
with four on the road, where were posted Buchell's and De Bray's
cavalry, under General Bee, and Polignac's division, the last in
reserve. In the wood on the left of the road from Mansfield, Major, with
two brigades of horse dismounted, was to drive back the enemy's
skirmishers, turn his right, and gain the road to Blair's Landing. As no
offensive movement by the enemy was anticipated, he would be turned on
both flanks, subjected to a concentric fire, and overwhelmed. Though I
had but twelve thousand five hundred men against eighteen thousand in
position, the _morale_ was greatly in our favor, and intelligent
execution of orders was alone necessary to insure success.

At 4.30 P.M. Churchill was reported to be near the position whence he
would attack; and, to call off attention, Major Brent advanced his
twelve guns into the field, within seven hundred yards of the enemy's
line, and opened fire. Soon thereafter the sound of Churchill's attack
was heard, which the cheers of his men proved to be successful. Walker
at once led forward his division by echelons of brigades from his right,
Brent advanced his guns, and Major turned the enemy's right and gained
possession of the road to Blair's. Complete victory seemed assured when
Churchill's troops suddenly gave way, and for a time arrested the
advance of Walker and Major.

The road from the Sabine reached, Churchill formed his line with the two
Missouri brigades, General Parsons on the right, and the two Arkansas,
General Tappan, on the left. Advancing three fourths of a mile through
the forest, he approached the enemy's line, and found that he had not
gained ground enough to outflank it. Throwing forward skirmishers, he
moved by the right flank until the Missouri brigades were on the right
of the Sabine road, the regiments of horse being farther to the right.
Churchill should have placed his whole command on th