ladelphia
for the purpose of endeavouring to accommodate this dangerous
commotion.
At his head quarters, at New Windsor, on the North River, General
Washington received intelligence of this alarming mutiny. Accustomed
as he had been to contemplate hazardous and difficult situations, it
was not easy, under existing circumstances, to resolve instantly on
the course it was most prudent to pursue. His first impression--to
repair to the camp of the mutineers--soon gave place to opinions which
were formed on more mature reflection.
It was almost certain that the business was already in the hands of
the civil government, with whose arrangements it might be improper for
him to interfere. Independent of this consideration, other motives of
irresistible influence detained him on the North River.
The most important among those subjects of complaint which were
alleged as the causes of the mutiny, were true in fact, were common to
the whole army, and were of a nature to disseminate too generally
those seeds of disquiet, which had attained their full growth and
maturity in the Pennsylvania line. Strong symptoms of discontent had
already been manifested; and it was, therefore, impossible to say with
confidence, how far the same temper existed among the other troops; or
how far the contagion of example had or would spread.
The danger arising from this state of things was much increased by the
circumstance that the river was perfectly open, and afforded Sir Henry
Clinton an easy and rapid transportation for his army to West Point,
should the situation of its garrison invite an enterprise against that
post.
It was an additional consideration of great weight, that it might have
a most pernicious influence on the discipline of the whole army,
should the authority of the Commander-in-chief be disregarded. He
ought not to place himself in a situation where his orders might be
disobeyed with impunity; an event much to be apprehended, should he
repair to the camp of the mutineers, unattended by a military force
adequate to the occasion.
Such a force could not be immediately commanded. His effectives in the
Highlands amounted only to thirteen hundred and seventy-six men; and
that whole division of the army, dispersed at various and distant
stations, excluding the sick and those on furlough, did not exceed
four thousand. Assuming therefore the fidelity of the troops, it was
impracticable to march immediately with a force sufficient
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