ior impression as to the
relative merits of the work by the amount of its success,_ and, for a
like reason, disregarding all emotions and impressions which are not
the immediate and proximate result of an excitor influence of, or
pertaining to, the _things artificial_, as a bona fide equivalent of
the _things natural_.
Or the premises may be practically stated thus:--(1st.) When one
looks on a certain painting or sculpture for the first time, the
first notion is that of a painting or sculpture. (2nd.) In the next
place, while the objects depicted are revealing themselves as real
objects, the notion of a painting or sculpture has elapsed, and, in
its place, there are emotions, passions, actions (moral or
intellectual) according in sort and degree to the heart or
mind-moving influence of the objects represented. (3rd.) Finally,
there is a notion of a painting or sculpture, and a judgment or
sentiment commensurate with the estimated merits of the work.--The
second statement gives the premised conditions under which Fine Art
is about to be treated: the 3rd statement exemplifies a phase in the
being of Fine Art under which it is never to be considered: and
furthermore, whilst the mental reflection last mentioned (the
judgment on the work) is being made, it may occur that certain
objects, most difficult of artistic execution, had been most
successfully handled: the merits of introducing such objects, in such
a manner, are the merits of those concomitants mentioned as equally
without the scope of consideration.
Thus much for the premises--next to the re-establishment of
principles.
1st. The principle was elicited, that Fine Art should regard the
general happiness of man, by addressing those of his attributes which
are _peculiarly human_, by exciting the activity of his rational and
benevolent powers; and thereafter:--2nd, that the Subject in Art
should be drawn from objects which so address and excite him; and
3rd, as objects so exciting the mental activity may (in proportion to
the mental capacity) excite it to any amount, and so possibly in the
highest degree (the function of Fine Art being _mental excitement_,
and that of High Art being the _highest mental excitement_) that all
objects so exciting mental activity and emotion in the highest
degree, may afford subjects for High Art.
Having thus re-stated the premises and principles already deduced,
let us proceed to enquire into the propriety of selecting the Subjec
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