. As I firmly believe
the divine precept delivered by the Author of Christianity, 'there is
not a sparrow falls to the ground without my Father,' and cannot admit
the agency of chance in the government of the world, I must necessarily
refer every event to one cause, as well the danger as the escape, as
well the sufferings as the enjoyments of life: and for this opinion, I
have, among other respectable authorities, that of the Bible. 'Shall
we,' says Job, 'receive good from the hand of God, and shall we not
receive evil?' The Supreme Being is equally wise and benevolent in the
dispensation of both evil and good, as means of effecting ultimate
purposes worthy of his ineffable perfections; so that whether we
consider ourselves as Christians or philosophers, we must acknowledge
that he deserves blessing not more when he gives than when he takes
away. If the fall of a sparrow, as well as its preservation, is imputed
to Providence, why not the fall as well as the preservation of a man?
And why should we attribute to Providence only what appears to be good
in its immediate effect, when we suppose that the whole concatenation of
events, whether the preservation or destruction of particular parts,
tends ultimately to the good of the whole? The same voice commissions
the winds to plough up the deep, which at the appointed time rebukes
them, saying, 'Peace, be still.' If the adorable Author and Preserver of
Nature was such a being as Baal is represented to have been by the
prophet, when he derided his worshippers; if he was sometimes on a
journey, and sometimes asleep, we might with propriety say that a fire
_happened_ to break out, or a storm to rise, but that by the
interposition of Providence life was preserved, expressions which imply
that the mischief had one origin, and the remedy another; but such
language certainly derogates, from the honour of the great Universal
Cause, who, acting through all duration, and subsisting in all space,
fills immensity with his presence, and eternity with his power.

"It will perhaps be said, that in particular instances evil necessarily
results from that constitution of things which is best upon the whole,
and that Providence occasionally interferes, and supplies the defects of
the constitution in these particulars; but this notion will appear not
to be supported by those facts which are said to be providential; it
will always be found that Providence interposes too late, and only
moderates t