vol. i. p. 194).

[Footnote 1: J. Freudenthal, _Spinoza und die Scholastik_ in the
_Philosophische Aufsaetze, Zeller zum 50-Jaehrigen Doktorjubilaeum gewidmet_,
Leipsic, 1887, p. 85 _seq_. Freudenthal's proof covers the _Cogitata
Metaphysica_ and many of the principal propositions of the _Ethics_.]

[Footnote 2: The Spanish Jesuit, Francis Suarez, lived 1548-1617. _Works_,
Venice, 1714 Cf. Karl Werner, _Suarez und die Scholastik der letzten
Jahrhunderte_, Regensburg, 1861.]

[Footnote 3: M. Joel, _Don Chasdai Crescas' religions-philosophische Lehren
in ihrem geschichtlichen Einfluss_, 1866; _Spinozas Theo.-pel. Traktat
auf seine Quellen geprueft_, 1870; _Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinozas mit
besonderer Beruecksichtigung des kurzen Traktats_, 1871.]

[Footnote 4: _Spinozas neu entdeckter Traktat elaeutert u. s. w_., 1866;
_Spinozas kurzer Traktat uebersetzt mit Einleitungen und Erlaeuterungen_,
1870.]

[Footnote 5: _Ueber die beiden ersten Phasen des Spinozistischen
Pantheismus und das Verhaeltniss der zweiten zur dritten Phase_, 1868.]

[Footnote 6: _Spinozana_ in Fichte's _Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie_ vols.
xxxvi., xlii., lvii., 1860-70.]

The logical presuppositions of Spinoza's philosophy lie in the fundamental
ideas of Descartes, which Spinoza accentuates, transforms, and adopts.
Three pairs of thoughts captivate him and incite him to think them through:
first, the rationalistic belief in the power of the human spirit to possess
itself of the truth by pure thought, together with confidence in the
omnipotence of the mathematical method; second, the concept of substance,
together with the dualism of extension and thought; finally, the
fundamental mechanical position, together with the impossibility
of interaction between matter and spirit, held in common with the
occasionalists, but reached independently of them. Whatever new elements
are added (_e. g_., the transformation of the Deity from a mere aid to
knowledge into its most important, nay, its only object; as, also, the
enthusiastic, directly mystical devotion to the all-embracing world-ground)
are of an essentially emotional nature, and to be referred less to
historical influences than to the individuality of the thinker. The
divergences from his predecessors, however, especially the extension of
mechanism to mental phenomena and the denial of the freedom of the will,
inseparable from this, result simply from the more consistent application
of Cartesian pri